As we begin the 19th annual volume of the
Fifties Frog Magazine there is still plenty of material surfacing; some
documents historical events, some tainted by fading memories and some just for
fun stuff. All is welcome and we will attempt to be clear about its
authenticity or lack thereof. If we fail
in that do not hesitate to call the breach to our attention. If we do not tell
the story now it may not be told.
Lee Hughs has the
thankless job of keeping a Roster of our Frog members, spouses and friends. Our
primary method of communicating is by email. To go to another method would be
costly in money and manpower. So, it is incumbent upon the member to keep Lee
informed when the email address changes.
Any Frog or Spouse of a Frog who wishes to be in
communication with others will soon have an updated list of addresses for their
use.
Another issue is notification when a member or
spouse deceases. Lee and your editor should both be notified in the event that
happens.
Suggestions for improvement
of the magazine are welcomed.
Don C. Marler, Editor
Vignettes of WWII UDT in
the Pacific
[Editor’s note: this article is a continuation of
the series provided by Mack Boynton, who preserved an old history of UDTs of
which there is one typewritten copy extant. There is more to come. Just a
reminder to the reader that the grammar and misspellings are largely left as
they appear without question or comment. For those who may not be familiar with
it, the term (sic) is an editorial way of saying the preceding spelling, etc.
is the error of the author not the editor.
This chapter is especially rife with errors of many
kinds: spelling, grammar, dropped sentences and sections repeated. Admiral Onderdonk is also listed as Onderdonf
and Oderdond. Nevertheless, the chapter has some
interesting detail of early UDT learning experiences – perhaps more than any
previous chapter. For example, it was
Team SEVEN that developed high-speed pickup.
Your editor is a founding member of the Laffite Society, located in Galveston, Texas, so it was of
interest that Team SEVEN was once on the USS JEAN LAFITTE, AKA USS WARREN. Like it’s namesake the ship had a very
confusing existence. A brief history of the WARREN is given in the Dictionary
of American Naval Fighting Ships and its service record tracks closely that of
Team SEVEN. Those interested can view it online with access through Google or
other channels.]
Don C. Marler,
Editor
HISTORY OF UNDERWATER DEMOLITION
Composed entirely of Sea Bees from Camp Peary, Virginia, Classes 5 and 5A went through training at
Fort Pierce, Florida during March and April of 1944 in units of one officer and
five enlisted men. At this time the program had not developed fully, as there
were on (sic)
precedents by which to proceed. As a result there was very little
swimming practice; the problem of approaching the beach and returning was never
solved, at least to the extent of a maiximum (sic)
survival of personnel, and personnel were too heavily clothed in guns, field
shoes, helment, (sic) and heavy "Mae West"
life jackets. Later experience, of course, brought about radical changes in
these three phases of training. Early in April the units were concolidated (sic) to form teams SIX and SEVEN.
On Easter Sunday, 9 April, Team Seven departed for
San Francisco, and then by ship to the Demolition Base at Maui, T.H. Soon after
its arrival there, the team received Lieutenant BURKE as its Commanding Officer
and Lieutenant (jg) ONDERDOND (sic) Became Executive
Officer.
Here also the training program was in its embryonic
stage; moreover, as always remained the case, it differed from Fort Pierce
doctrines. This team was among the first to recive
(sic) emphasized training in reconnaissance. The methods there developed as to
dropping swimmers, obtaining information and recording it on charts became fundamentally
the basic form of swimming reconnaissance. One major fault corrected, after the
teams experience later at Saipan, was in having the
LCPR stop beside each swimmer to retrieve him. Moreover, no opportunity was recived (sic) to practice off an
On 30 May, in company with Teams
At 0830 on
(a) Determine
location and extent of underwater obstacles, antiboat
mines, barriers, booms and all other
obstructions which would prevent the
passage of LVTs.
(b) Select
and mark best approaches to designated beaches through which channels could
be blasted.
(c) Existence,
height and charadter (sic) of coral lip at edge of
reef.
(d) Depth
of water over reef and in lagoon.
(e) Condition
of surf at edge of reef.
(f) Extent
and types of obstacles encountered on reef and in approaches to designated beaches.
(g) Extent,
type and size of anti-boat mines encountered.
(h) Extent
and type of any obstacles observed on beaches proper.
(i) Character of seaward edge of reef.
(j) Estimate
of ability to clear desired channels.
In regards to demolition, Team SEVEN was ordered by
the Operation Plan to do the following:
(a) Clear
and mark at least one channel with a minimum width of at least fifty feet from the edge of the
reef to each of the designated beaches
to allow passage of LVTs.
(b) Clear
beaches of all horned scullys, jetted rails, booms,
barriers, etc
(c) Blast
and mark at least two twenty feet wide passages per beach over lip of coral reef in order to permit passage
of DUKWs.
To insure that the maximum benefit from
reconnaissance be attained it was ordered that the data obtained be
disseminated to Admirals HILL, TURNER, and OLDENDORF (sic) stationed on ships
U.S.S. CAMBRIA, NOROVIA and INDIANAPOLIS respectively as soon as possible after
reconnaissance.
While the beaches had been failry
(sic) easy to distinguish before disembarking, platoon leaders were given last
minute insturctions (sic) to rendezvous about the
ship to get proper compass bearings to each beach. This information was not
received and the LCPRs proceeded without guidance.
Proceeding under sporadic and poorly directed Naval gunfire support, each platoon conducted it's
reconnaissance. While casualties had been suffered by some of the personnel in
the LCPRs prior to leaving the craft, the
reconnaissance was completed and all required information secured.
The reaction of the Japanese to our Naval fire is
difficult to evaluate. At Saipan they opened up on
the supporting warships with some large guns, necessitating a withdrawal to a
longer range and return to former positions after knocking out the disclosed
targets. Partly as a result of this, heavy enemy machine gun, sniper, small
caliber gun and mortar fire was encountered. In addition, twelve barges moored
alongside the pier at Blue One Beach endangered the team with heavy and fairly
accurate mortar fire. Naval air support was at this time occupied elsewhere and
the little air cover provided was very poor and inefficient.
In training at Maui the only tactic used in picking
up a swimmer was to approach him with the craft, bring it to a stop and allow
the Swimmer to drag himself into a rubber boat which was provided alongside the
LCPR and from there jump into the LCPR. Here it was discovered that motion of the
LCPR was necessary to minimize the chances of receiving hits from the mortar
she1ls that the Japs were dropping around the LCPRS
(sic) . Consequently a life ring with a line attached
was rigged and this was thrown to a swimmer as the LCPR approached and passed
him. The end of the line was held by a man in the boat and the swimmer was
dragged safely into the LCPR. A smoke screen was ordered by Lieutenant BURKE
just prior to this which probably hepled (sic) reduce
the accuracy of the enemy fire.
During the reconnaissance, Japs
could be seen moving around the beach and several gun and sniper positions were
apparent. By using, thirty caliber machine guns mounted on the LCPRs and manned by
By drawing fire from the beach installations and
barges valuable information as to the enemy fire power was secured. Heavy Navy
gunfire was later concentrated on known targets on the beach, barges, and
snipers in the tree tops on D-l Day and the morning of D-Day preparatory to the
landing of the assault troops.
While all the swimmers bad plastic diver's slates
and pencils with them to use on the reconnaissance to note information, none
were used by the men because of the undesirability of stopping long enough to
record what was being seen, thus minimizing the chances of being hit by the
enemy.
Radio communication between the LCPRs
and the swimmers was carried out with no success on this operation but the use
of
No obstacles of man-made nature or mines were found
on the beaches; consequently, no demolition of man-made obstacles was required.
As noted heretofore the Operation Plan called for clearing and marking of
certain channels through the reef. However, the discovery of a highly navigable
natural channel Charan Kanoa
Channel, on Blue Beach One which would serve well to get Landing Craft into the
beach proper, minimized the necessity for blasting channels through the reef.
As navigational aids to small craft, two buoys were placed at the mouth of Charan Kanoa Channel at 2200 on
D-Day. In the morning of D plus 1 Day eight additional buoys were placed to
further difine (sic) this channel.
Some blasting for LST and small boat channels was
attempted but very little success was realized. On D plus 1 Day the Blue Beach Beachmaster requested that a 100 foot channel be blasted
through the reef several hundred yards to some deeper water along the beach.
The previous day's reconnaissance had showed, however, that the water along the
beach at the part selected was not navigable even for small craft and a channel
would serve no useful purpose. However, it was decided that an attempt should
be made so on D plus 1 night the work was performed. The reasons for failure to
realize a true channel are several, of which the following may be noted:
(a) Just
prior to firing a message was received to hold the firing period until the following morning, as at
that time, the front line was less than
200 yards offshore and any blasting would have endangered our own Marines. Thus after being
exposed to the action of the surf overnight, it was found on firing the
explosive charge the next morning that
some of the Prima cord had become wet. As a result, detonation of the powder was
not complete.
(b) The
nature of the coral surrounding the Marianas Islands is that of a very high density sand-cemented coral
which does not lend itself to disintegration. Thus, on charging it
and blasting, the result is an area of
craters and free coral boulders which require further blasting or removal by earth moving equipment.
On D plus 3 morning, powder
was placed in an attempt to form an LST ramp 100 yard (sic) wide and
thirty-five yards deep. This operation was fairly successful although the ramp
was rough and somewhat irregular.
Experience in blasting coral for this operation
indicates the inability to improve the face of a sloping hard coral reef for an
LST ramp. While blasting is extremely effective in clearing boulders or coral
beach and roughly shearing the lip off an abrupt reef, any demolition on a
sloping reef worn smooth by wind, water and tidal action, will result only in
scattered craters and the formation of a coral lip that in itself constitutes
obstacles, unless the scattered debris is cleared by earth moving equipment.
Miscellaneous blasting of coral heads and boulders
along the beaches to clear roads for LVTs and trucks
along the reef tops and buoying and flagging positions along the reef lip for
LST approaches, completed the work required of Team SEVEN on the Saipan operation.
This operation was the first in the Pacific Theater
of operations which fully committed Underwater Demolition. Consequently much
was learned there about the various tactics which constitute an Underwater
Demolition operation. These lessons could not have been foreseen and were not
foreseen by the various training staffs to which Team SEVEN had been exposed.
It can be very easily seen that in order for a Demolition
Team to conduct its work successfully with a minimum amount of exposure of it's
personnel to enemy intimidation, the enemy must be kept in abeyance. This can
be done, by a fire support which closely co-ordinates itself with the work of a
Demolition Team. As a result of the Saipan operation
it was found expedient to recommend and, realize a fire support, the source of
which is as close to the beach as possible and one in which the use of rapid
fire small caliber guns is emphasized. Further it was thought feasible to
assign members of Underwater Demolition Teams directly to fire support ships to
act as liaison between the two factions during the course of an operation and
to acquaint the gunnery officers aboard these ships with the type of fire which
would best serve demolition.
Much was learned too about the communication network
of a Demolition Team in operation. The striking point here was that radio
communication between the CLPRs and the fire support
ships should be direct and fire calling should be familiar to all officers of a
team. Also it was learned that communication between swimmers and LCPR
personnel was impractical, so such communication was discontinued.
The use of swimmers and LCPRs
was mildly revolutionized as a result of the Saipan
operation. As stated heretofore, all four platoons of the team were assigned a
beach and all personnel of each platoon were assigned duty within that platoon.
It later became apparent that should anyone of these LCPRs
become a casualty by enemy fire or causes inherent in machinery, there would be
no help or relief for it without imposing upon another LCPR which was busily
engaged on another beach. Thus it was felt expedient to embody in plans of
future operations provisions for reserve and stand-by LCPRs
whose sole function would be that of aiding operational LCPRs
which had become immobilized. Further, swimmers were redistributed in the LCPRs in accordance with the "operational
reserve" plan. It was felt that fewer swimmers would be used in an
operation proper and the remaining swimmers allocated to the reserve LCPRs as a reserve swimmers again in case of an operational
LCPR becoming immobilized.
It was also apparent that immobility of landing
craft was an invitation to disaster and manuevers
(sic) of LCPRs were initiated and employed by the
coxswain. Such, for example, as approaching and leaving the beach in a zig-zag, picking up swimmers while in motion at a speed of
up to 2200 RPMS, retreating from the beach after the swimmers had disembarked,
and performing figure eights at high speed until the swimmers were prepared to
be retrieved.
With the necessity for this continuous speed came
the need for methods of discharging and retrieving swimmers while the LCPR was
moving. The use of a rubber boat tied along the seaward side of an LCPR had
been initiated at Maui; however, the problem was to get an exhausted swimmer
into it while going 2200 RPH. This problem was solved by the rigging of a stiff
line with two loops, one at each end, having an overall length of three feet.
One loop was to be retained in the hands of a man placed in the rubber boat.
The second loop was to be caught by the hands of the
swimmer being retrived (sic). The swimmer had thus
made contact with the rubber boat via the man in it and the double looped line
and was pulled into it with very little difficulty.
Much was learned about the gunnery required on an
LCPR being employed in an Underwater Demolition operation. On the Saipan operation the gunnery consisted of two thirty
caliber maching (sic) guns mounted in the two forward
machine gun mounts and a tommy gun operated by a
gunner gositioned (sic) between these in the rqmp (sic) of the LCPR. Later operations saw the inclusion
of a bow and stern fifty caliber maching (sic) gun,
in addition to the two thirty caliber machine guns.
All of the suggestions, recommendations, and changes
made apparent by Team SEVEN's operation on Saipan were made on future operations by that team and were
incorporated into the Underwater Demolition scheme to become standard procedure
in all Underwater Demolition operations in the Pacific. They were embodied in
the training program at Maui when Team SEVEN was sent their (sic) later to
train new teams coming to the Pacific.
The interim of time between the Operation of
Underwater Demolition Team SEVEN on Saipan and that
on Tiniam it's next operation, was spent, for the
main part, in confinement aboard the
On 22 June, the team was transferred to the U.S.S.
STRINGHAN, (
Before embarking on the combat reconnaissance of
Yellow Beaches Captain, now Major, James L. JONES, Commanding Officer of the
Marine contingent and Lieutenant BURKE were warned not to alert the beaches, so
Lieutenant BURKE ordered that should signs of the beach having been alerted
present themselves, personnel shall retire from the beach. As the swimmers on
this operation were debarking from their rubber boats which had been brought
into within 500 yards from the beach, several shots were heard which gave the
impression that the beach had been alerted and that the enemy knew of our
presence. In accordance with orders the swim personnel returned to the rubber
boats to the
The main operation by Underwater Demolition Team
Seven on Tinian was on 23 July 1944 and was a
diversionary daylight reconnaissance of a barrier reef off Red, Green, and Blue
Beaches for a total of 2500 yards. These beaches were just off Sunharin Town and it was hoped to make the enemy believe
that this was where the anticipated landings, which were to be made the
following day, would be staged. The plans for the diversionary reconnaissance
embodied many of the recommendations developed as a result of the operation on Saipan. For this operation only three LCPRs
were used as operational craft, and from each of these only seven swimmers were
dropped. A fourth boat located a thousand yards from the reef was dispatched
(sic) as a reserve and standby boat and in this were present seven standby
swimmers. The curtain of gunfire and air strikes were described as superb in
accomplishing their purpose. The effectiveness of this support can be
demonstrated by stating that the only enemy fire encountered was sniper fire
and this, upon investigating, totaled three shots in number. Large caliber
naval fire at known targets combined with steady forty millimeter fire into the
beach and above the water's edge effectively covered the operation. The reef
which was reconnoitered on this operation was of the barrier type and extended
out from the beach proper from 500 to 1000 yards. Since this was only a
diversionary feint, swimmers were ordered to go no closer to shore than the
inner edge of the reef. One natural channel and a questionable natural small
boat channel presented themselves on aerial photographs and mapes
(sic). Certain swimmers were designated to investigate the former for it's navigability and freeness of obstructions and mines and
the latter for its questionable being. This channel was not found and proved to
be a misinterpretation of the photographs. The reef was found to be a flat,
relatively smooth top reef which would present no obstruction to passage of LVTs or DUKWs. No obstacles or
mines were found after forty-five minutes of reconnoitering by the swimmers. No
casualties were suffered.
The post-assault work of Team SEVEN commenced on
D-Day. A thorough search for anti-boat mines off the fringing reefs on Beaches
white One and Two was made. No mines were found, but unexploded rockets and
bombs were removed to the beach. Personnel encountered enemy machine gun fire
but no casualties were incurred. On D plus 1 and D plus 2 pontoons were placed
on While (sic) one and White Two. The Team aided in
the placing of these pontoons, and some demolition on the beach was necessary.
The work at Tinian
completed, Team SEVEN, began dreaming about coming back to the States. A transrer of personnel from the team and the U.S.S.
STRINGHAM to Team
Just prior to the team's commencing its operation on
23 July, the
STRINGHAM and two destroyers were ordered to
stand-by the U.S.S. NOA (
At this time the tide was low, exposing the reef for
100 yards from the beach, thus limiting the area in which the swimmers could
safely investigate. As a consequence, it was recommended that whereever (sic) possible, future reconnaissances
(sic) should be conducted at high tides.
Results showed that the reef was smooth and flat
with a gentle slope to the beach, with steel tripods and rows of wooden posts
about seventy-five yards from the beach. Log barriers and concrete cribs were
reported on the beach about thirty yards above the high water mark.
On the night of D minus 1, 14 September, it was
decided to remove the obstacles on the beach. Poor planning and excessive
manpower coupled with the inevitable confusion of night work resulted in a
disappointing operation On D-Day morning, however, three team officers were
dispatched with the charts showing the condition of the beaches at that time.
Unfortunately the STRINGHAM disembarked these men so far from the beaches off
which the control vessels were located that the information was too late in
arriving. As the data that Demolition accumulates is of no practical value
unless provisions are made to make it available to the assault wave commanders
before they are committed, it was recommended that such provisions be made even
if Demolition Teams had to operate as many as five days previous to the
invasion.
At 1030 on D-Day one LCPR with personnel and
explosives reported to the Beachmaster for duty. The
unit also laid anchorage buoys. On D plus 3 a . reconnaissance on
At 1500 on D plus 3 a reconnaissance of Scarlet
Three reported finding thirty-nine J-l3 mines and many obstacles. These latter
consisted of imbedded steel and concreted rails and steel tetahedrons
(sic). The first were twenty pounds,
light-gage rails. Planted about five feet high. Those of
concrete gate. As a consequence,
it was recommended that wherever possible, future reconnaisences
(sic) should be conducted at high tides.
After a ten day inter-island
leave. it was assigned to the base as the training team. During the
team's absence many improvements had been made on the base both in living
conditions and the quality and diversification of the training. Teams ELEVEN
through SIXTEEN were trained at the hands of Team SEVEN personnel, thus
receiving the benefit of that outfits experiences and mistakes as have been
outlined above. Meanwhile, the team itself suffered many personnel changes, the
most important of which was the departure of lieutenant (jg)
ONDERDONK to become Commanding Officer of Team FOURTEEN. Lieutenant (jg) ROBBINS took over as Executive Officer.
During January 1945, the team itself went through an
advanced training and reconditioning program before being ordered out on 14
February to Leyte Gulf, the staging area for the
Okinawa invasion, aboard the U.S.S. HOPPING (
In San Pedor Bay, Leyte Gulf, one rehearsal for this operation was held. Then
on 23 March, the task fleet left for Okinawa. Here the team was scheduled to
make a reconnaissance of Yellow Beaches on the western side of the island on Leve minus 4 day; however, to enable the minesweepers to
complete their mission, this was delayed for one day until 29 March.
The plans provided for one pair of swimmers every
100 yards on a 1200 yard beach to swim to the high water mark. In addition,
four swimmers were assigned to swim across the reef parallel to the beach. In
order to have as few landing craft as possible approach the beach, only two
were used to drop the swimmers. One additional boat with the reserve swimmers
was held in readiness 2000 yards from the beach. The primary fire support for
this operation was provided by LCI(G)s firing forty milimeter (sic)
shells at the beach. This, in turn was backed by destroyers, cruisers,
battleships and air combat patrols Entering (sic) the water at high tide in a
flat and caml (sic) sea, the swimmers approached the
beach facing the sun.
The information brought back by the swimmers was
quite comprehensive. It was found that LVTs and DUKWs could cross the gradually sloping reef which was
composed of hard live coral covered with sand. Only a few coral heads were
found; on Yellow One, however, fissures would prevent landing craft from
unloading vehicles on the reef. Yellow Two and Three were excellent for both LSTs and LCMs. The beaches
themselves were well-defended with pillboxes and gun positions, but no opesition (sic) was encountered other than sporadic sniper
fire.
Three rows of wooden posts, imbedded in the reef,
were in place across Yellow Two Beach, approximately forty yards from the high
water mark. It was estimated that there were 200 of these posts, averaging six
inches in diameter and six feet high, wedged into holes on the reef. From the
amount of sea growth of the posts, it was apparent they had been in the water
for along (sic) time. Although the team reported that these did not constitute
an obstacle to assault waves mounted in LVTs, it was
decided, nevertheless, to return the following day to destroy them.
This operation w s (sic) carried out, using one
block of tetrytol for each post. During the time the
men were working, there was no opposition from the beach. The deep fire support
was presummably (sic) good but the close-in fire of
forty milimeter (sic)
guns was erratic one of the team's swimmers being wounded by this fire.
Many of the men were affected by the cold water, suffering cramps.
Results showed that the reef was smooth and flat
with a gentle slope to the beach, with steel tripods and rows of wooden posts
about seventy-five yards from the beach. Log barriers and concrete cribs were
reported on the beach about thirty yards above the high water mark.
On the night of D minus 1, 14 September, it was
decided to remove the obstacles on the beach. Poor planning and excessive
manpower coupled with the inevitable confusion of night work resulted in a
disappointing operation On D-Day morning, however, three team officers were
dispatched with the charts showing the condition of the beaches at that time.
Unfortunately the STRINGHAM disembarked these men so far from the beaches off
which the control vessels were located that the information was too late in
arriving. As the data that Demolition accumulates is of no practical value
unless provisions are made to make it available to the assault wave commanders
before they are committed, it was recommended that such provisions be made even
if Demolition Teams had to operate as many as five days previous to the
invasion.
At 1030 on D-Day one LCPR with personnel and
explosives reported to the Beachmaster for duty. The
unit also laid anchorage buoys. On D plus 3 a reconnaissance on Orange Three
Beach was conducted for anit-tank mines. None were
found. The ramainder (sic) of the post-assault work
was performed on the southwest side of the island on Scarlet Beaches One, Two
and Three, and 200 yards of Purple Beach.
At 1500 on D plus 3 a reconnaissance of Scarlet
Three reported finding thirty-nine J-l3 mines and many obstacles. These latter
consisted of imbedded steel and concreted rails and steel tetahedrons
(sic). The first were twenty pounds,
light-gage rails, planted about five feet high. Those of concrete measured six
inches by six inches by five feet. The tetahedrons
were seven feet by seven feet and constructed of light weight pipe or
reinforced bars. In two days, the team succeed (sic)
in clearing this area.
Scarlet Beaches One and Two revealed obstacles
consisting of the same size concreted rails, as on Three, placed about fifteen
feet aprt (sic) with barbed wire and plain wire
strung among them. Around every third or fourh rail
were wood tetahedrons (sic) filled with rocks and
coral. More mines were also located. Heavy loading was necessary on large
obstacles, but the demolition was successful.
The 200 yards of Purple Beach disclosed three
parallel rows of obstacles. The first composed of logs; the second the shoreward
of the first was composed of steel rails; and the third was composed of
reinforced concrete posts. Single blocks of tetrytol
on each obstruction were sufficient to destroy them.
On 21 September, the STRINGHAM left for Manus. There
the team was ordered to transfer its powder to the U.S.S. CLEMSON, an
As usual, on the day the invasion, some of men from
the team led the assault waves into the beaches. On the following day a
reconnaissance was conducted of Yellow Three Beach and for a distance of some
200 yards up a river. No demolition work was considered necessary.
During the next four days additional reconnaissances (sic) were made of White, Baker, Purple
Baker and Brown Baker, all behind the fromt (sic)
lines, to ascertain Their (sic) capacity for the
unloading of supplies. There, on 7 April, another reconnaissance was carried
out on Red Baker Three Beach, on Tsingeu Shima, three days before the invasion of that islet.
Excellent fire support was received from two destroyers, the U.S.S. MORRISON
and U.S.S.
While the HOPPING was still on screening duty off Tsugen Shima, on 9 April, shore
batteries opened fire with armor-piercing projectiles. One of these exploded in
the troop quarters, resulting in nine demolition casualties, one of whom died.
The ship was able to leave the next day for Ulithi
Atoll in the Caroline Islands, where the team was put ashore for five weeks.
Finally aboard the U.S.S. JEAN LAFITTE, the team was transported back to San
Francisco, where each man was granted thirty days leave.
Reporting in to Oceanside, California on 11 August,
the team was most disappointed, when it learne (sic)
that it was to go back to sea again in spite of Japan’s impending surrender.
Loaded aboard the U.S.S. AUMAN (
On 4 September, the AUMAN reached Tokyo Bay. There
for ten days no work was engaged in, so the team recieved
(sic) occasional liberty ashore. On the 14th the team was given orders to
proceed to Sundai about 185 miles north along the
east coast of Honsho there to conduct a
reconnaissance. Both this, and a scouting party, which looked
for roads for the incoming troops, were dispatched the next morning. The
information attained was compiled and sent to C.T.G. 322. Returning to Tokyo Bay, the AUMAN left for
the United States on 21 September.
Upon arrival at
Ramon
S. “Van” Vandawalker.
Van who passed away on October 28, 2012 was a graduate of class 48 NCDU and
assigned to UDT 15 during WWII. The USS Blessman, the ship carrying Team 15 was attacked by
Japanese bombers just off Iwo Jima
with the loss of 23 Frogs wounded and 18 killed. Van was thought dead but
revived and recovered to rejoin his teammates. See more on the account of the
bombing of the USS Blessman
at the following website:
http://www.viewoftherockies.com/UDT15.html
Thanks
to Steve “Moose” Robinson and Franklin Anderson for notifying us of this event.
Jim Bishop We are waiting for more information on Jim’s passing.
Bob Zink We
are waiting for more information on Bob’s passing.
Homer C. Marshall Doc Marshall passed away from
complications following abdominal surgery
Birger Stromsheim 10/11/1911—11/10/2012. Birger was not a
Frog but performed a great Frog type operation in 1943 when he and his crew of
fellow Norwegians destroyed the Norsk Hydro plant.
The plant made “heavy water” (deuterium oxide) critical to the German effort to
create the atomic chain reaction that would lead to the Nazi bomb. The film The
Heroes of Telemark (Kirk Douglas and Richard
Harris--1965) portrayed these activities. He was heavily decorated for his part
in the Norwegian resistance.
Maxine
Otte: Walt Otte’s wife Maxine passed away in early November 2012 from
a longstanding heart condition. Our condolences go out to our comrade Walt.
UDT THREE -- PARTICIPATION
IN MINE CLEARANCE
WONSAN,
Mack Boynton
[EDITOR’S NOTE: Mack Boynton has contributed another interesting
historical account of Frogs in Korea. We invite more such stories. First hand
stories add a dimension to our history that has been neglected.]
*****
The great success of the Inchon landing, led
Mac Arthur to order a second amphibious assault targeting Wonsan
on Korea's east coast. As the Inchon landing
was drawing to a close, UDT
UDT THREE commenced operations on 10
October, ten days before the scheduled amphibious landing. On the initial
reconnaissance we discovered the approaches to the landing beaches, as well as
the entire harbor, were well saturated with moored mines. We were
fortunate to have the services of a “chopper” from the USS ROCHESTER that
could spot the mines which were at about 15 foot depth and visible in the
clear water. The USS DIACHENKO
(
The water was extremely cold and the old "dry suits" left much
to be desired, but our operations continued while awaiting the arrival of the “minesweeps”. The landing was postponed from 20
October to 26 October. The entire landing force composed of the First
Marine Division came to a complete stop.
UDT THREE was overjoyed to see the minesweeps, PIRATE
(AM 277) and PLEDGE (AM 275) come
steaming into the mined area with all flags flying and all sweep gear engaged
on 12 October. UDT small boats were off their port beam; number one boat
with Lt. Harry Nowak in charge, and I was in charge of number two boat -- as
they passed us close aboard we waved and cheered, and they responded by
doing the same. We were in a position to see the swept mines pop to the
surface and they were destroyed by gunfire from the sweeps.
The PIRATE was the first vessel
mined, it appeared to have made contact with a mine on the starboard side and
was listing to starboard and sinking rapidly. To make matters worse,
a shore battery commenced firing upon her. By the time Harry's boat came
along side to pick up wounded and survivors, the fantail was awash. My
boat headed for the PLEDGE which was
mined shortly after the PIRATE.
I went to the bridge where I found bodies, but no survivors. It appeared
that the bridge took a direct hit by the shore battery leaving no one
alive. My boat loaded many wounded, and searched other areas of the ship
for any survivors, and collected “dog-tags” from those who were dead as
we only had room on our small boat for survivors.
The PLEDGE was also sinking,
but at a slower rate than the PIRATE.
We watched as PIRATE rolled
over exposing most of the keel. Number one boat proceeded to
take PIRATE's
survivors to one of the other ships. I departed the PIRATE and took the survivors and wounded to the USS INCREDIBLE.
I returned to the DIACHENKO and
picked about twelve UDT men, all well armed -- including grenades and
demolition packs. I had observed a shore battery high on a ridge while
they were firing upon the PIRATE and PLEDGE and proceeded to a point on the
beach where I could not be observed by the battery. I picked two point
men and we proceeded up the ridge about a mile distance, to the shore
battery. We came upon the North Korean gun crew who were busy getting
their wheeled guns ready for departure and were not aware of our
presence. We tossed grenades and opened fire. A fire fight ensued
-- all the North Koreans were killed! We put demolition charges on
all of their guns. We found harbor charts that were marked off in grids
with ranges and elevations giving complete and accurate fire control to the
harbor area that made the PIRATE and PLEDGE sitting ducks.
Following the sinking of the PIRATE
and PLEDGE, UDT was ordered, if
feasible, to dive on the sunken minesweeps to recover
any classified material. I was the only Master Diver in the team and I
selected George Gionnotti as a diving partner.
The ships were in about 100 feet of water. We made the dive and
discovered that the shore battery had demolished most of the area we were
concerned about. COMSERVPAC ordered a salvage ship (ARS) to make a four point moor over the target area and to
make surveys of the sunken ships.
UDT THREE was relieved at Wonsan by UDT
Mac Arthur was on his way...
LT(jg) Gordon
"Buster" Tribble
briefing team members on mine search.
*****
Frogmen in
Korea….
Phil Carrico
FROGMEN
PREPARING FOR RAID – preparing firing caps, time fuse and prima cord while
sitting on 60 pd. packs of
Preface:
At this age memories are fleeting at best – as they
flash by I keep scribbling them down on paper because somehow I keep thinking
they may jog the memory of those who may have forgotten - and pray God will
help us and America to remember…
*****
A SPOOKY
The day
As I remember we were in the middle of a series of
raids along the West Coast of Korea. We had gone in that night, via rubber
boats, to blow a railroad bridge. The communist opened up on us before we got
to the beach; evidently this was an important facility and they had set up an
exceptionally stout defensive posture to protect it.
We abandoned the operation, which was standard
procedure if we drew fire before reaching the beach, scurried back to the ship
and went to bed, thinking the ship would get underway to our next objective.
At daylight the next morning a loud “Bang” shook us
out of bed – on rushing to the fantail in our skivvies we found the ship was
shooting at the bridge.
They were trying to knock the bridge out with the ship’s forward 5-inch gun. We
understood the ship’s Captain had made the decision to try his luck and had run
circles all night approaching the bridge at daylight.
It was a beautiful day with fleece clouds decorating
the skies; we were shouting and yelling encouragement to the gun crew as they
peppered shell after shell at the bridge. The ship’s bridge was screaming at
us, “Get the hell off the deck, we’re at General Quarters”.
Suddenly a geyser of spray erupted just 50 yard
short of the ship, we were all thinking our gunners had made a terrible shot,
when another geyser blossomed just seaward of the ship. It dawned on all of us
at the same time the ship had been bracketed by a shore battery. The wild
stampede of a bunch of half-naked Frogs to get inside off the open deck should
have been recorded by film. Of course it sure as hell was not funny at the time
– but now, looking back on it, it seems hilarious.
The little ship set down in the stern like a scared
goose as the below deck guys cranked on flank speed – and we hauled ass out of
there like a scalded hound.
After the ship had scrambled out of danger some of
us began peeking out the hatch to see what was going on. As we watched, the gun
crew swiveled the 5-inch gun and started walking shells up the mountain where
the communist battery was located. When they got to the top they put it on full
automatic and laid about six rapid rounds right on top of the enemy gun.
The ship’s gun crew had done no damage to the
bridge, but knocking the enemy gun out had saved face for them - however we
could find no solace for ourselves. Compounding our problems, we received
verbal abuse like only a salty old Chief Boats can do it - for going on deck
during General Quarters.
THE WAR WITHIN A WAR
In the Japanese port of Yokosuka
the U.S. Marines had set up an MP station prior to the Korean War. In those days
they had built a furious reputation for being “hard asses”– and the sailors who
went ashore in that port had to “Walk On Eggs”, as the
saying goes. Many sailors, who went ashore in those days and got a bit out of
line, had felt the wrath of that MP aggressiveness.
When the war started, suddenly the port was filled
with sailors and the Marine MP’s added to their staff, determined to keep their
“Iron Ass Policy” intact.
UDT Teams arrived early and began using that port as
a debarkation point to raid the Korean coastal transportation routes. The Teams
would insert from Yokosuka and make from 4 to 6
preplanned raids, then come back to Camp McGill (just out of Yokosuka) to plan and train for the next series. After
repeating this action a number of times – and getting shot up on a number of
operations, the guys began to question their longevity on this earth. So its
not surprising that after a while they began letting it all hang out when
returning to Yokosuka in one piece.
Of course that put them on a head-on collision
course with the iron ass MPs. As the number of incidences increased we began to
hate those MPs more than the communists and began spending as much time
planning operations against them as we did against the communists.
Some of those operations were ingenious, and too
many of them occurred to tell here – however, this one operation caused a death
and that seemed to curb the violence on both sides.
The guys had planned an operation where they would
sucker the MPs into raiding a certain bar on the outskirts of the city. The
success of the plan depended on the MPs rushing to the location in their
vehicles and storming inside. When they did, our guys would steal their
vehicles and drive away.
The plan worked like a charm. On one occasion as the
MPs rushed into the bar, a Frog jumped into one of their vehicles and took off.
As the Frog took off, the Sergeant of the MP detail was driving up in a jeep.
He saw his vehicle speeding off with a sailor at the wheel and took off after
it. The Frog was racing into the foothills outside the city with the jeep in
hot pursuit – our Frog did not make a curve and ran off a 200-foot cliff.
With this Frog’s death, the war within a war came to
a screeching halt.
Postscript:
I did not include the Frog’s name in this article
because driving off a cliff running from Marine MPs is not the most glorious
way to die in a war. However, he will be remembered as a true hero by all of
us. He had previously been awarded the Bronze Star and other awards for heroic
action at Wonsan.
Even at this late date, if you were a Marine MP in Yokosuka during the early 50’s – walk softly around us….
Comment:
This note from Betty Swendsky.
I want
to thank everyone for the beautiful card all signed. It brought tears to my
eyes to think you all thought of me.
I go next month to Tom’s funeral in Ft. Pierce. I’ll be moving next month to
North Carolina to live with my son and his wife. I love you all.
Betty
ANNOUNCEMENT:
The 2013 Fifties Frogs Reunion will be held:
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FAX: 303-321-1966
Reservations can be made anytime by calling 888-238-6762
Room rates are locked in at $69 per night for both
single and double occupancy rooms.
Dinner is scheduled for Saturday night,
Clarence "C. J." Lueb
is hosting this event and can be reached on his cell phone at 303-884-6165.
Register Early
Seeking Information:
I am doing research for a
book featuring Korean War participants from the upper-central states. I’ve been
researching Lt. Philip Mastor, from Bemidji, MN, for
inclusion in the book. He died “under honorable conditions” in Japan on August
21, 1951.
Mastor was in UDT-21 in WWII, and he was reactivated for
Korea in August, 1950
I haven’t been able to
find family members or war buddies so far. His father was from Greece.
Thanks,
Merry Helm
Historian: 24th Infantry
Division Assn.
[ Editor’s note: If you knew
Lt.jg. Mastor (sometimes
shown as Master) or anyone who may have information on him please contact the
inquirer below.
While searching for information on this old
Frog we ran across a reference to one of our still living Frogs—Phil Carrico. See his medal award write up at:
http://www.davidbruhn.com/images/MINE_WARFARE_HALL_OF_VALOR.pdf ]
John Thomas Fell:
My Dad, John Thomas Fell served in Korea, I believe
UDT 1. He passed in’92 but I am looking for anyone who may have served with
him. Thanks.
[Editor’s
note: Anyone with information on Mr. Fell please contact his son Jon A. Fell at
jonafell@msn.com]
Frank
Anderson reports that Jim Fox has advised that his son Nathan Fox
(composer/singer/songwriter) has just released an album “I’m All Done”. Good
luck with it.