Fifties Frogs Magazine Vol 4

Pg 2

Excerpts of letters from George  Atcheson
to Captain L. Lavrakas
 

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Atcheson continued

Steaming at flank speed, we made Sasebo by noon, and sent Foley ashore to the hospital. By then I knew Foley's wounds were not from my .45, but from the Koreans' rifles. I took small comfort from that. In retrospect, haste may have had a hand in our poor performance, the elapsed time from boarding the PBM to our return to Sasebo being only about 30 hours. Historical note: The night's events had made Foley the first US Naval casualty of the Korean War. I recommended him for a Silver Star which ADM duly awarded him.
 
UDT One soon arrived in the Bass, another fine APD, along with part of the 1st Marine Division's Recon Company. We joined them for a series of six recons and demo raids giving our morale a big boost, mine especially.

UDT One's MO was quickly honed in two practice landings in Japan. Step one was four swimmer recon to check the beach environs. If clear, the Marine security force would land and establish a perimeter. A special photo recon flight had been flown for us and we had excellent stereo photos. The demolition teams would then land and carry charges to previously assigned demo targets. The coast we would be working was mountainous with many tunnels and small bridges, and the RR track pushed down close to the water by the steep terrain behind. down close to the water by the steep terrain behind. We planned to ignore the tunnels as being impervious to the small charges we could carry and concentrate on blowing track and bridges. Explosives were #40 TNT or C3 plastic packs each containing, if I remember, #10 blocks connected by primacord. Both TNT and C3 are very stable, not even to be detonated by rifle fire.

The Team 3 eleven joined Team One at Camp McGill in Japan and were included in their demo and recon ops. They had part of the 1st Marine Brigade's Recon company attached to provide target site security. And a good thing too.
We embarked on the Bass which had carried Team One from San Diego. The skipper of the Bass at that time being LCDR Ray, and Team One being skippered by LCDR David F. "Kelly" Welch. Our first demo op was a dud because of people on the beach, but the next three were successful: we blew up lots of track and 3 small bridges. As for the NK's, things were uneven full and no one bothered us. Only once did a train pass through while were loading the track, but because we had orders to avoid the NK's, we had to grit our teeth and hunker down. The orders were correct, I think. Either you're there to do demo or shoot people but not both.

We then moved around to the West Coast and did three recons, ostensibly to fool the NK's, the thought being that if they had gotten wind of the forthcoming Inchon operation this might fool them. Whatever! The first two were uneventful, but on the last on a beach at the edge of the Kunsan airport, we ran into trouble. There were NK troops camped on the field and they took us and our Marines under fire.

Photo above: UDT-3, April 28, 2004,
Biloxi MS, at West Coast Reunion
  (click to enlarge)

Atcheson continue

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Atcheson continued

We abandoned the recon and got back in our boats, but then got back in the water and towed the boats as best we could

Further out, at the LCPR's, we learned we had two wounded and were missing Marines. This was quickly done. The Marines, five of them as I recall, had waded out as far as they could, disassembled their rifles, throwing the parts away, and waiting patiently, treading water. "We knew you'd be back", one of them said. But the raid had its heavy cost as one of the wounded, Sergeant Matachek was paralyzed from the waist. down.

The following year I was again in Korea, this time assigned to the training of a night raider unit for work similar to our UDT demo raids. The program was under the aegis of the CIA and manned by North Korean refugees, young men who escaped from the north in chaos of the war's early days. Chosen originally to form escape and evasion teams for the rescue of downed airman, they formed a cadre from which I could draw about 30 men for my Special Missions Group Although not really any better prepared for raider ops of the SEAL type than I was before, I could only forge ahead. The Koreans had been through a sort of boot camp already, and were eager and very fine fellows to work with. Our first operation was a nice success. We revisited an old UDT target and worked it over again, this time even trapping a locomotive which blundered in the pre-dawn darkness into the space where the bridge had been. It was winter then with snow on the ground. We went ashore in white coveralls. It was too cold for a swimmer recon. We just went on in, counting on the snow and the starlight to help us out. The Koreans did fine, just as I had hoped. Although I had an interpreter, I opted to leave the operation pretty much up to the men's good sense, reserving only the making and setting of fuse lighters for myself.

In spite of our successes some time passed before we could be assigned another ship, but when the time came, the ship was again my old friend the Bass, now captained by LCDR Lavrakas. My memory is hazy about that time and has gotten no better since. I recall we had several raids planned. Some went well, some failed because no targets were found or some high surf cancelled it. And one was a disaster. The recon party had gotten ashore uneventfully, and the demo teams were on their way in when a firefight began. We had been sucked into an ambush. The LCPR's were in close, the demo teams were half ashore an half afloat and things were very bad. The Bass boat crews performed with cool courage, working right up into the shallows to gather up whoever made it back to the water. The boats were in so close that several returned with grenade fragments embedded in their hull. My interpreter was killed while standing beside me in a LCPR. Several of my Korean troopers were taken prisoner by the North Koreans, a fate I would not wish on anyone. Shaken and bedraggled, we returned to the ship for a sad voyage home. One bright spot came the next day far off the coast, we came upon a motor fishing sampan, broken down and in distress with three crew still aboard, two alive and one dead. The Bass' captain and crew, in the best traditions of the sea, hoisted  the  sampan aboard, fed the survivors, and wrapped up the poor dead man, got the motor running and dropped the lot of them close enough. But then, the engine would not restart. Grind, grind, slower and slower, fuel almost gone, no other way home. My nerves were stretching painfully tight when the damn thing finally started. By then the boats were alongside and we were okay. Their foray had been a success with a large variety documents and passbooks, and three "prisoners," two middle aged men and a young woman. To this day I have some qualms about the prisoners. I am not hard- hearted enough for this business-but they seemed content, maybe glad to be leaving. They had, after all, come along willingly or so I told myself. We chugged our way back to Pusan and turned over our loot and our captives to "proper authority" and I was done.

Two weeks later I was on my way back to Coronado and reassignment.

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MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Washington DC, Jan 17, 1961
"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquision of unwarranted influence, where sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex," President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned in his farewell address on Jan 17,1961. Retired Army Lt General Andrew Goodpaster, who served on the President's staff, offers insight on Eisenhowers' mindset.
"Eisenhower had a tremendous ability to look at a problem as a whole in the light of what is the overarching need, the requirements to which forces should respond. He brought that into the White House.

With the military-industrial, he was deeply concerned about these groups, particularly the military and the military industry, working together with the backing of Congress and elements of the press. They were pressing to do things, crash programs in particular, that he did not think were in the best overall interest of the United States.

"He experienced a lot of pressures, of many kinds, for crash programs he was convinced were not needed, were costly and would not add to national security, but in fact was the so-called 'missile gap' (between the Soviet Union and US). he knew there was no missile gap and he was not going to be strong-armed into a crash program of building missiles."


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