The main concern of an editor is whether he/she will
have enough material for the enterprise. Thankfully, that is not the case
currently. We have some good material to share with you in the coming issues.
We hope the magazine will be a source of history for
the UDT/SEAL historians in the future. Yet, not all of what is included is
serious stuff. We are having fun with stories that are less than factual.
Furthermore, even the serious articles are not and cannot be checked for
accuracy. As we age some of the serious stuff will inadvertently vary from
truth because of fading memory; so, buyer beware.
In this issue we begin an extended piece titled Vignettes of WWII UDT in the Pacific brought to us by Mack Boynton. It will be
continued in the following issues of the magazine. It is a fine example of a
primary source document that is the backbone of authentic history. We hope to
have more of such documentation.
Judging by the reader feedback apparently you are enjoying the Fifties Frogs Magazine. Please make it
available to anyone you know who may be interested, including your local
library.
Don
C. Marler, Editor
VIGNETTES
OF WWII UDT IN THE PACIFIC
[Editor’s Note]
This article comes from
an old manuscript that was type written, likely under less than optimal
conditions. There were some typographical and spelling errors. These have been
corrected and not called to the reader’s attention. Care has been taken to not
change any content, so no sentence structure has been changed and no rewording has
been attempted.
Preface
It is my pleasure to make this history of the Underwater
Demolition Teams available to anyone interested in the factual operation
of the Teams in the Pacific; and especially
to the "Fifties Frogs", a group of Navy Frogmen who meet
annually, to relive old times and memories, when they too were facing
enemy gunfire, clad only in swim trunks, fins and facemasks. The ranks of
these warriors are thinning, but their skills and bravado are also a major
part of our Naval History.
The lack of accurate reef intelligence had nearly caused a military
disaster in 1943 when nearly a third of the Marines landing on Tarawa
(Betio) were killed or wounded in the early stages of the landing.
After the Tarawa operation, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander of the Fifth
Amphibious Force, conferred with CINCPAC and COMPHIBPAC, and other Fleet
Commanders seeking a solution to the problems of natural and man made obstacles
on beaches that could stop an invasion and cost the lives of many of the landing
force. The Navy knew that even bloodier battles lay ahead on the march
across the Pacific in route to Japan. Little did they know of the
formidable barriers that UDT would encounter in the European Theatre.
As the result of the conference in Pearl Harbor Admiral Turner
recommended the small Naval Combat Units be re-organized into
Underwater Demolition Teams of thirteen officers and one hundred men. As
training units and volunteers increased a total of some thirty Teams were
commissioned. The march across the Pacific had begun and the exploits of
these Under Demolition Teams are told in this history. It is factual and was
recorded while the teams were operating under combat conditions.
Mack Boynton
******
In the MARIANAS operation, Underwater Demolition Teams proved
their effectiveness in beach clearance and their ability to operate in daylight
with adequate fire support. With conclusive proof of UDTs practicability and
value, the need for a centralized command interested only in UDT activities
became immediately apparent. The training program was expanded to provide for
more than 30 operational teams of 100 men each, necessitating a higher echelon
of operational command. The standardization of tactical procedures, for
exploitation of new equipment and training methods, for developing means of
coordinating the information gained by UDTs and disseminating it to the assault
forces - for all these reasons, it was decided after the MARIANAS operation to
form an Underwater Demolition staff under an overall Underwater Demolition
Commander.
Accordingly, late in November 1944, the new command was set up
as a Group Command under the Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Captain B.
HALL HANLON, USN was named the first Commander of Underwater Demolition Teams.
The mission of ComUDTs was three-fold: first, he took responsibility for
certain administrative functions. Through the Administrative Command of
PhibsPac, he was to oversee the training of the teams to ensure that
experimental projects were carried through and that new devices and equipment
were made quickly available and to coordinate the activities of the UDT
Training Bases at Ft. Pierce, Florida and at NCDT&E Base, Maui, T.H.
Further, the choice of teams and responsibility for their preparedness for a
particular operation were given to ComUDTs and his staff as well as
arrangements for the teams’ rest and rehabilitation after an operation. ComUDTs
second function was planning. Responsibility for writing training orders and
operation plans, for briefing and rehearsing the teams, and for carrying on
liaison with the Fire Support ships and the Assault Forces was allotted to the
staff. Finally, ComUDTs was given tactical functions. During an actual UDT
operation, ComUDTs was to have immediate control of all participating UDTs,
APDs, and close fire support ships (LCI(G)s and DDs).
The staff was made up of 14 officers and 21 men, about half with
demolition experience, and was divided into Operations, Demolitions,
Communications, Intelligence, and Administrative departments. The staff
embarked at PEARL HARBOR on its flagship, the U.S.S. GILMER (APD-11) on 28
December 1944. The GILMER was a converted four stacker and the staff office
space and living quarters, compressed into the upper and lower forward troop
quarters, were considerably cramped. ComUDTs required his own flagship since he
had been given tactical control at the objective, and since the staff proposed
to operate almost continuously in the forward areas under both the THIRD and
FIFTH Fleets, whichever was conducting an operation.
Not all the staff immediately embarked on the GILMER, however,
ComUDTs and two members of his Staff left PEARL HARBOR on 25 December 1944 to
observe the LINGAYEN operation and to coordinate the activities of the UDTs
committed. The flagship remained at PEARL. ComUDTs flew to the forward area and
witnessed the operation from the flagship of the Comdr. of the Support Force.
During this operation, on ComUDTs directive, Army liaison personnel from high
echelons of the assault units were, for the first time, assigned to operating
UDTs as observers, and rough UDT charts showing the results of their reconnaissance
were prepared. The charts were reproduced on gelatin “Ditto” pads and a limited
distribution of them was made on D-Day to certain command ships of the assault
forces.
Up until this time, UDT training and mission had been purely for
demolition of obstacles, but it was perceived that UDTs could in the future
perform very valuable work of a reconnaissance nature, even though no
demolition of obstacles was necessary. The teams participating at LINGAYEN had
had no training in the hydrographic reconnaissance, as distinct from demolition
function and the information contained on their charts, although valuable, was
not complete. Further, the distribution of the information was very limited and
did not take place until D-Day just at the hour of the assault.
During the course of this operation, the ship on which ComUDTS
and the two members of his staff were embarked was hit by a suicide plane, but
no UDT staff personnel were injured.
Meanwhile, the rest of the staff went aboard the GILMER at PEARL
and immediately went to MAUI to conduct rehearsals with the teams selected for
the IWO JIMA operation. A training order was written and detailed rehearsals in
reconnaissance and in actual demolition were conducted over a period of three
days. The reconnaissance and demolition functions were conceived of as wholly
separate with the reconnaissance coming first. Base charts of all the practice
beaches and their approaches were made up by the staff, drawn to a uniform
scale, and distributed to each team for the plotting of the information gained
by the reconnaissance. After each UDT rehearsal, personnel from the teams came
aboard the flagship where they were interviewed and the information gained was
digested into dispatch form and was also placed on a master chart to be reproduced
in quantity, on an Ozalid white print machine which was installed on the
flagship. Speed in getting this information ready for distribution was
emphasized, LCI(G)s simulated support fire during these rehearsals and a
detailed schedule of maneuvers for the fire support ships was drawn up and put
into effect. A lengthy list of reports to be made by voice radio by all
participating units during the actual operation was drawn up, and a flag plot
procedure was established to coordinate these reports and thus keep ComUDTs
constantly informed of the activities of all units under his control.
Demolition activities of various teams were coordinated and planned in detail
to avoid the danger inherent in un-concerted action.
These rehearsals were invaluable in training the staff and gave
rise to many of the techniques that were to become standard. At the end of the
three - day period, the flagship returned to PEARL where it continued work on
the UDT operation plan for IWO JIMA. Early in January, the flagship departed
for ULITHI where the four teams selected for the IWO JIMA operation had already
gathered on their APDs. ComUDTs was recalled from LINGAYEN to PEARL HARBOR to
make and eyewitness report to Cincpac on Jap suicide plane technique, after
which he flew to ULITHI to rejoin his staff.
At ULITHI, two further rehearsals were held, for which the Staff
prepared Training Orders. These rehearsals were conducted with the supporting
LCIs and DDs that were to be used at IWO and the emphasis was on working out
complete plans for the most effective use of fire support.
At ULITHI, ComUDTs’ first operation plan for IWO was
distributed. It contained a minutely worked out time schedule for all Units
involved with all teams based on their relationship to "ROGER" hour,
which was set as the time that the LCP(R)s carrying the swimmers crossed the DD
line on their way to the beach. It contained detailed fire support areas,
positions, and techniques, and provisions for distributing UDT information by
means of dispatches, charts, and return of Army liaison personnel.
En-route to the objective, at SAIPAN, the staff conducted a
final rehearsal on compiling and distributing UDT information.
At IWO JIMA, four teams made a successful reconnaissance of the
Eastern Beaches on the morning of D-2 and of the Western Beaches in the
afternoon. No demolition was necessary. During the operation, all support and
operating units were controlled by ComUDTs from the flagship. The LCI(G)s, on
taking station at a pre-arranged time, apparently gave the Japs the impression,
from the regularity of their approach, that they constituted an assault wave.
They encountered heavy fire and all received hits. However, their withdrawal
was accomplished and casualties were speedily transferred. These circumstances
put a heavy load on the flagship voice circuits. As a result, team and swimmer
reports were somewhat confused from lack of circuit discipline and some delay
was encountered in withdrawing the teams because of the lack of complete
knowledge as to whether all swimmers had been recovered by their boats. This
communication confusion was complicated by the fact that the current at IWO
swept several swimmers southward so that they were recovered by different boats
than they had started from.
Several hours after each reconnaissance, a dispatch summarizing
the UDT information was sent from the Flagship for relay to the Attack Forces
approaching the target. On the night of D-2, two members of the staff, with 4
Marine liaison personnel and 4 men from the teams were put aboard the single
reserve APD and sent back to rendezvous with the Attack Forces. They were
transferred at sea to the Attack Force and TransRon flagships with copies of
the dispatches and UDT charts. At dawn on the morning of D-Day, when the Attack
Forces arrived in the area, further transfers of staff personnel with charts
were made to command ships. In accordance with ComUDTs Op-Plan, each team
furnished guides to the first landing waves, while staff personnel reported to
the Force Beach Master.
On the night of D-1, the U.S.S BLESSMAN (APD-48) with UDT 15
embarked was hit by a Jap bomb. The GILMER, ComUDTs’ flagship, went alongside
and staff personnel took an active part in putting out the fire on the BLESSMAN
and taking off casualties. On D plus 2, members of the Staff conducted a
reconnaissance of a sand shoal off Purple Beach. This mission was accomplished
with the GILMER and two of her LCP(R)s. A quick withdrawal was necessary
because of accurate mortar and machine gun fire but the mission was satisfactorily
accomplished.
On D plus 2, D plus 3, and D plus 4, members of the staff
supervised the work of teams personnel in aiding to clear the beaches which had
become congested with broached landing craft. On D plus 4, ComUDTs turned over
command of the team at IWO to the senior UD Team Commanding Officer, and
reported to ComPhibsGroup ONE with his staff for planning purposes.
The flagship departed IWO for LEYTE and advanced planning for
the OKINAWA operation was done en-route. On arrival at LEYTE, the UDT Operation
Plan for OKINAWA was completed and distributed. It embodied all the proven
techniques, the lessons learned from IWO, and several new ideas. The
feasibility and importance of wide and early distribution of UDT information
had been demonstrated at IWO. As a result it was planned to distribute
information in four ways: by dispatch, by chart, by a report amplifying the
information in the dispatches and charts, and by liaison personnel who would be
returned to all Army assault units down to BLTS. The dispatches were to be on
the completion of each reconnaissance or demolition operation; the charts,
reports, and personnel were to be put aboard reserve APDs on D-2 to rendezvous
with Attack Forces on D-1. On D-1 at sea, the charts and reports with UDT
personnel would be distributed to all Navy TransRon, TransDiv, Attack Force,
Control and Tractor flagships and Army personnel would be returned to their
respective battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps. The fire support ships,
under this Plan were to make their approach in a staggered, irregular formation
so as not to present the appearance of a landing wave. Further refinements in
the system of radio reports were made so as to ensure that swimmers would be
accounted for at all times. More definite arrangements for supporting air
strikes and smoke cover were made. A minesweeping annex was added to the plan
to aid in integrating UDT operations with sweeping operation.
While at LEYTE, a training order was written and rehearsals were
had with 6 teams who were to operate on the main landing beaches at OKINAWA. On
12 March 1945, the staff left LEYTE in the flagship and proceeded to ULITHI
where the 4 teams to be used at KERAMA RETTO and on the Demonstration beaches
were staging. Further rehearsals were had with these teams and with the fire
support ships.
On D-8 these latter 4 teams and the flagship arrived in the
objective area. On D-7, a member of the staff accompanied each team in its
reconnaissance of the beaches in KERAMA RETTO to aid in the preparation of the
dispatches, charts and reports. The dispatches were sent in the afternoon of
D-7 and the information contained therein was received in sufficient time by
the Attack Forces to enable them to make necessary changes in their landing
plan in accordance with UDT recommendations. Just at daylight on D-6, the day
of the landing in KERAMA RETTO, the flagship of ComUDTs was struck a glancing
blow by a Jap suicide plane, but damage to the ship was light and there were no
casualties among staff personnel. Distribution of charts, reports and personnel
from the flagship to various echelons of the Attack Force continued until
H-hour.
On D-5, the flagship with the other 6 UD Teams which had arrived
in the area from LEYTE, proceeded to the main beaches of OKINAWA where they
made a visual reconnaissance of the beaches from the APDs. On D-3, a very
successful reconnaissance was made with the loss of but one man. More than 3500
obstacles in the form of wooden posts set in the reef edge were discovered
during the reconnaissance, most of which were considered to constitute a
barrier to LVTs. In four shots, each carefully coordinated by ComUDTs, these
obstacles were blown out of the beach approaches without incident. The
information gained by the swimmers was collected, reproduced and made ready for
distribution on the flagship according to plan, and all Army-Marine liaison
personnel (total 30) were returned to their parent unit on D-1 morning.
Congratulations on the excellence of the job performed were received by ComUDTs
in dispatches from the Secretary of the Navy, and ComPhibsPac.
On D plus 6, ComUDTs departed the area by plane to make a rapid tour of forward bases to investigate possible sites for UDT rehabilitation centers, and then to go on to the UDT Training bases for a comprehensive survey of the future training program. The Chief Staff Officer and two staff members transferred to another APD to begin planning for the IE SHIMA and Eastern Islands operations, which were to follow almost immediately. Administration and the bulk of the staff remained on the GILMER which departed for PEARL HARBOR to start planning future operations. The staff members remaining in the OKINAWA area wrote and distributed a ComUDTs Op-Plan for IE SHIMA and briefed personnel of the two teams selected for that operation. Frequent conferences with the Fire Support
Commander resulted in excellent fire cover and the reconnaissance
operations, lasting two days were completed without casualty. No demolition in
the pre-assault phase was necessary although considerable blasting was done
shortly after the landing to clear an approach channel for LSTs. Immediately
after the landing on IE SHIMA the staff representatives departed for PEARL
HARBOR to rejoin the rest of the staff and ComUDTs who returned to PEARL from
the West Coast on May 3, 1945. On 7 May, most of the staff moved over to the
MAUI to observe training, handle administrative work, and prepare for a
conference on UDT work with representatives of BuOrd, Ft. Pierce, NCDT&E
Base and AdComPhibsPac.
On 6 June 1945, ComUDTsPhibsPac was awarded the Navy Cross for
the IWO JIMA operation and the Legion of Merit for the combined operations of
IWO and OKINAWA by ComPhibsPac aboard the latter’s flagship at GUAM. In
accordance with BuPers orders, Capt. Hanlon was then detached and his Chief
Staff Officer Comdr. D.L. KAUFFMAN, USNR became acting ComUDTs.
June 17, 1945, Captain R.H. RODGERS, USN, reported and assumed command as ComUDTs at PEARL HARBOR. Arrangements were made to send 30 teams on 30 APDs to ATB Oceanside, California for a month's cold water training to begin 15 August 1945. At this time, a new command organization for UDTs was authorized by ComPhibsPac. The Underwater Demolition Group was made a Flotilla and two subordinate squadron commands were provided for. Captain RODGERS assumed the dual responsibility of Commander, Underwater
Demolition Flotilla
and Commander Underwater Demolition Teams. Under him were Underwater Demolition
Squadron ONE and TWO, each with a flagship and a separate Staff. The U.S.S.
HOLLIS (APD-86) was selected as flagship for the UD Flotilla and the U.S.S.
BLESSMAN (APD--48) and the U.S.S LANING (APD-55) were designated squadron
flagships.
On 30 June 1945, ComUDTs departed PEARL for MANILA to report to
ComPhibsPac. The rest of the Staff followed, and was embarked on the USS R. W.
HERNDON (APD-121), temporary flagship, in MANILA. ComUDTs Operation Plan 7-45
for the KYUSHU operation, was written and reproduction began. It was ComUDTs
intention to return with his Staff to Oceanside on 15 August to supervise the
cold water training and the Operation Plan was to be distributed from there.
With the Japanese peace offer on 10 August, twenty of the UDTs in training on
the West Coast were alerted, and with the Jap surrender on the l4th, they were
ordered to proceed at once to the forward area. ComUDTs, still in Manila,
immediately wrote and distributed an Operation Plan (No. 8-45) that would serve
as a general guide in the occupational tasks ahead. ComUDTs ordered his
flagship forward from PEARL HARBOR and hoisted his broad command pennant at
GUAM on 25 August 1945.
The flagship proceeded at once to TOKYO BAY – the first ship
routed directly from GUAM to TOKYO. Under the Operation Plan, for the
occupation, the U.S. Flotilla had been divided into 3 groups of 6 teams each,
one to serve under the direction of each of the THIRD, FIFTH and SEVENTH
PhibFor Commanders. The Flotilla was under the overall command of ComUDTs for
the direction of the Groups in performing any services within the limits of
their training and equipment. The teams in each group performed reconnaissance
of several landing points and encountered no enemy opposition. Further valuable
assistance was given to the landing forces in harbor clearances and ship
demilitarization work by the UDTs.
While at TOKYO, authority was delegated to ComUDTs by
ComPhibsPac to effect the withdrawal of the UD Flotilla from the operation area
back to the West Coast, and to plan the re–organization of the UDTs on a
peace–time basis. Conferences at TOKYO relative to the withdrawal of the THIRD
UD Group were satisfactorily completed, and the flagship departed TOKY0 to
confer with SEVENTH PhibFor representatives at OKINAWA. While conferences were
taking place at OKINAWA, an approaching typhoon necessitated the formation of
all ships present into Retirement Groups that proceeded west to ride out the
storm. ComUDTs in his flagship was designated ComEscorts for the Retirement
Groups. Returning to OKINAWA further conferences were held, and on 24 Sept.
ComUDTs proceeded to WAKAYAMA, HONSHU for conferences with the Com5thPhibFor.
The discussions as to the dates for team withdrawals were quickly concluded,
and on 28 September, the flagship with the staff embarked, started for the West
Coast via OKINAWA, GUAM, and PEARL HARBOR, there to set up the peacetime UDT
program with headquarters at ATB, Coronado.
ATTACHMENTS
UDT27/P8 ASD/lnk
UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM TWENTY-SEVEN
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
4
October 1945
From: The
Commanding Officer,
To: The
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
Public
Information Office.
Subject: Team
History – Submission of.
Reference: (a)
AlPac 219
Enclosure: (A)
Chronological History of UDT #27.
1.
In accordance with References (a), Enclosure (A) Is submitted for your information.
D.G.
SAUNDERS
I.
Formation – 15 February 1945, N.C.D.U., A.T.B., Fort Pierce, Florida. (a) Original basis of team – 17 officers,
and 100 enlisted personnel. (b) Divided into four operating platoons of (3)
three officers and (15) fifteen men in
each; plus a headquarters platoon of (3) officers and twenty-seven (27) men.
(c) Commanding Officer – Lieutenant David G.
Saunders.
Executive Officer (Temporary), CWO W. F.
Raymor.
II. Basic
Training – 15 February – 15 April 1945.
(a)
A conditioning course of training which included “Hell” Week, two weeks of explosives, two weeks
of recon- naissance, week of gunnery, week of
“Standard” and a week of “Pay-Off”.
(b)
During training, all volunteers that failed to measure up to swimming, and physical requirements were
dropped.
III. Transition
to Advanced Training Base – 29 April – 2 June 1945.
(a) Orders received for
eighty–seven (87) men, thirteen (13) officers to report to San Bruno,
California by 2400, 14 May 1945.
(b) Awaited transportation until
23 May 1945, then were transferred to Treasure Island, embarkation depot.
(c) Embarked USS SARATOGA – 25 May 1945, then
transferred FFT to Pearl Harbor.
(d) Arrived Pearl Harbor 31 May
1945, and immediately transferred to Maui, T.H., aboard LSM.
(e) Reached Maui, T. H., NCDT,
& E. Base on 1 June 1945.
IV. Commission
and Advanced Training – 2 June – 31 July 1945.
(a) Commissioned on 2 June 1945;
Lieutenant D.G. SAUNDERS, Commanding Officer. Began advance swimming program,
reconnaissance technique, specialized demolition training including coral and
lava blasting. Also invasion problems aboard APDs.
(b) Completed training at Maui,
T.H., 31 July 1945 with a complement of eighty-one (81) men and thirteen (13)
officers.
(c) Received orders on 2 August
1945 to return to A.T.B. Oceanside, California for cold-water swimming
training.
(d) Left Maui, T.H., aboard USS INGRAM (APD-43)
arriving at San Diego, California 9
August 1945. Took on supplies and gear, reported then to A.T.B., Oceanside,
California on August 12 1945.
(e) Change of orders upon
disembarking, replaced team aboard USS WALTER B.COBB (APD-106) on 13 August
1945; and with five other teams aboard APDs ordered to Segami, Wan, Japan.
V.
Further Action Up To Date; 13 August 1945 – 6 October 1945. (a) Aboard USS WALTER B. COBB
(APD-106) via Pearl Harbor and Eniwetok, arrived in Tokyo Bay,
Japan on 3 September 1945.
(b) Stood by awaiting operational orders as
needed; until 19 September1945, then received orders to
return to San Diego, California, via Guam for
reorganization .
(c)
Arrived in Guam on 24 September 1945, loaded inert gear to be returned to San Diego, and
passengers to Pearl harbor.
(d)
Left Guam 27 September 1945, stopping to refuel at Eniwetok on 29 September 1945.
(e)
Arrived in Pearl Harbor 6 October 1945 to refuel and drop passengers taken on at Guam.
Phil Carrico
Pop Karns’ bowling alley in Coronado was
the West Coast hangout for Frogmen in the late 40’s and early 50’s. The bowling
alley only had 4 lanes, lockers for civvies and a long bar. I don’t remember
ever seeing anyone bowl – just drink.
The facility sat beside the Amphib Base
across from the Silver Strand in Coronado and jetted out into San Diego Bay.
Pop’s was strictly a Frog hangout, strangers entered at their own risk. All the
local girls who hung out there had UDT stenciled on their butts.
Pop carried a tab for most guys, he
would lend you money in a pinch and stowed your private vehicle when ops were
extended. Many UDT vehicles were buried at sea off the rocks behind Pop’s into
San Diego Bay. Such happenings usually took place on the last night in Diego
when you shipped out to Korea.
I have often wondered how long Pop
served in this capacity. I know he was there when I left in ’52. However, he
was gone when I returned in ’03. Of course, if he had still been there he would
have been over a hundred years old, but it still messed up my head.
His son, Jack, who was in training class 6 was a popular guy. He was in Team 1. After discharge he was on the local police force. He died too young: date of death was August 3, 2006.
If anyone out there has any more info,
details or stories on Pop Karns please share.
Wow, Don---Great job with the 50's magazine. I am
truly impressed.
Robert Berry
Great Stuff Don -- Good work. Keep it up.
Thanks, Don Belcher.
HEY DON------GOOD JOB --
ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY DIDN'T KICK US OUT
OF THE HOTEL IN RIVERTON.. GERRY MEYER
Nan Dalrymple
Don, I was so
happy to get this and happy to hear from you. Again, I was unable to attend the
reunion. I had a granddaughter graduating from pharmacy school. I miss
all of you. Tell everyone hello for me.
My address is:
2325 Ragland Road
Mansfield Texas 76063
Tel. 972-835-4463
Nan
Tom Swedensky
wrote that he has received several letters from old team mates, indicating that
the article " The Raid At Long Dong PO " has caused some severe flash
backs. The most poignant letter came from team-mate Harry Barelka. Harry said
he could not sleep for several nights. Then it finally came to him, sure enough
after checking his little black book (he still has it) he found that “while we
were in that little Chinese Bar two of the Chinese soldiers borrowed $10.00
each”.
If you remember
Harry was the team loan officer (loan shark); he would loan money at 100%
interest, compounded every pay day and we were paid twice a month.
Now these loans
are still out-standing, which Harry says causes him serious mental anguish. At the present time Harry
is working through his Attorney, Furman Sims, Esq., and his second cousin
Hilary Barelka Rodham Clinton, secretary of state, to have these loans paid by
the Chinese government.
So far their best
offer is either Hong Cong Island, or the Great Wall Of China. Mr. Sims who is working
on 20% commission plus expenses, recommends holding out for more. Harry is still trying to
figure out the expense account for trips to Greece, Italy, Israel and Egypt. He is leaning toward
accepting the offer of the Great Wall of China and he will then offer franchise
opportunities for hot dog concessions. Any one interested in a franchise may contact his
attorney Mr. Furman Sims, Esq. who practices law in California.
Harry also stated
that if the Chinese government does not come to terms soon, he will have to
fall back on his old collection agency -- ie. Moody, Murray and James
Short.
Vivian Turner, the daughter of Kevin Roger Murphy, is seeking contact
with men who knew her father. She is speaking for her brother as well. They
lost contact with their father some years back and would like to correspond
with anyone who knew him. Kevin Murphy came through Class 8 on the West Coast,
was assigned to UDT 3 and UDT 12 and also served as an instructor at the
Training Unit. He died October 6, 2007 in Estes Park, Larimer County, Colorado.
Vivian's email address is vivian.turner@sbcglobal.net
Stories of
Naval Frogmen in Korea.
Phil Carrico
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Without
the help of many people this work may never have gotten off the ground. My most
sincere “Thanks” to the following:
1. Many old Frogs who were there and have better recall
than I – who critiqued this work and pointed out facts that I over looked or
had forgotten…their contributions made this work more correct and better. Far too
many of them contributed to start naming names – but “Thanks” guys…
2. Ex-Frog, Don Belcher, contributed to the design of
this book and did a great job – Thank you Don…
3. My wife, Laura, bless her – for the years I worked on
this project she accused me of becoming a recluse. She has finally come to
accept this obsession – (Well almost)…
4. Finally, to all you guys who served in the Teams in
Korea and to whom this work is dedicated – I hope you are beginning to realize
- you created a new chapter in Naval Special Warfare. By taking your ops
inland, above the surf line – you created the idea for the SEALS and SEALS have
become a major asset in fighting the kinds of war we are fighting today. BE
PROUD…and “Thank You” for serving.
Phil
Carrico
Review
of Stories of Naval Frogmen in Korea.
Phil
Carrico has presented here a series of stories that will inform and entertain.
There are 18 separate accounts all with photographs. You will be more informed
about the Inchon and Wonson Operations, the demolition of Hungnam as well as
becoming more familiar with team-mates you will remember. Carrico’s love and respect for the Navy
Frogmen is evident throughout.
His
determination to accurately record details of the events that occurred 60 years
ago is admirable. He is very sensitive,
however to “Old Frogs” and their memories.
He therefore welcomes your questions, comments and/or clarifications to
what he has written.
The
book is in 8 ½ X 11 format with an attractive cover (See above). It sells for
$15.00 plus $2.00 S & H.
Order
from Phil at: PO Box 531 Daisetta, Tx
77533
Don
C. Marler