The main concern of an editor is whether he/she will have enough material for the enterprise. Thankfully, that is not the case currently. We have some good material to share with you in the coming issues.
We hope the magazine will be a source of history for the UDT/SEAL historians in the future. Yet, not all of what is included is serious stuff. We are having fun with stories that are less than factual. Furthermore, even the serious articles are not and cannot be checked for accuracy. As we age some of the serious stuff will inadvertently vary from truth because of fading memory; so, buyer beware.
In this issue we begin an extended piece titled Vignettes of WWII UDT in the Pacific brought to us by Mack Boynton. It will be continued in the following issues of the magazine. It is a fine example of a primary source document that is the backbone of authentic history. We hope to have more of such documentation.
Judging by the reader feedback apparently you are enjoying the Fifties Frogs Magazine. Please make it available to anyone you know who may be interested, including your local library.
Don C. Marler, Editor
This article comes from an old manuscript that was type written, likely under less than optimal conditions. There were some typographical and spelling errors. These have been corrected and not called to the reader’s attention. Care has been taken to not change any content, so no sentence structure has been changed and no rewording has been attempted.
It is my pleasure to make this history of the Underwater Demolition Teams available to anyone interested in the factual operation of the Teams in the Pacific; and especially to the "Fifties Frogs", a group of Navy Frogmen who meet annually, to relive old times and memories, when they too were facing enemy gunfire, clad only in swim trunks, fins and facemasks. The ranks of these warriors are thinning, but their skills and bravado are also a major part of our Naval History.
The lack of accurate reef intelligence had nearly caused a military disaster in 1943 when nearly a third of the Marines landing on Tarawa (Betio) were killed or wounded in the early stages of the landing. After the Tarawa operation, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander of the Fifth Amphibious Force, conferred with CINCPAC and COMPHIBPAC, and other Fleet Commanders seeking a solution to the problems of natural and man made obstacles on beaches that could stop an invasion and cost the lives of many of the landing force. The Navy knew that even bloodier battles lay ahead on the march across the Pacific in route to Japan. Little did they know of the formidable barriers that UDT would encounter in the European Theatre.
As the result of the conference in Pearl Harbor Admiral Turner recommended the small Naval Combat Units be re-organized into Underwater Demolition Teams of thirteen officers and one hundred men. As training units and volunteers increased a total of some thirty Teams were commissioned. The march across the Pacific had begun and the exploits of these Under Demolition Teams are told in this history. It is factual and was recorded while the teams were operating under combat conditions.
In the MARIANAS operation, Underwater Demolition Teams proved their effectiveness in beach clearance and their ability to operate in daylight with adequate fire support. With conclusive proof of UDTs practicability and value, the need for a centralized command interested only in UDT activities became immediately apparent. The training program was expanded to provide for more than 30 operational teams of 100 men each, necessitating a higher echelon of operational command. The standardization of tactical procedures, for exploitation of new equipment and training methods, for developing means of coordinating the information gained by UDTs and disseminating it to the assault forces - for all these reasons, it was decided after the MARIANAS operation to form an Underwater Demolition staff under an overall Underwater Demolition Commander.
Accordingly, late in November 1944, the new command was set up as a Group Command under the Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Captain B. HALL HANLON, USN was named the first Commander of Underwater Demolition Teams. The mission of ComUDTs was three-fold: first, he took responsibility for certain administrative functions. Through the Administrative Command of PhibsPac, he was to oversee the training of the teams to ensure that experimental projects were carried through and that new devices and equipment were made quickly available and to coordinate the activities of the UDT Training Bases at Ft. Pierce, Florida and at NCDT&E Base, Maui, T.H. Further, the choice of teams and responsibility for their preparedness for a particular operation were given to ComUDTs and his staff as well as arrangements for the teams’ rest and rehabilitation after an operation. ComUDTs second function was planning. Responsibility for writing training orders and operation plans, for briefing and rehearsing the teams, and for carrying on liaison with the Fire Support ships and the Assault Forces was allotted to the staff. Finally, ComUDTs was given tactical functions. During an actual UDT operation, ComUDTs was to have immediate control of all participating UDTs, APDs, and close fire support ships (LCI(G)s and DDs).
The staff was made up of 14 officers and 21 men, about half with demolition experience, and was divided into Operations, Demolitions, Communications, Intelligence, and Administrative departments. The staff embarked at PEARL HARBOR on its flagship, the U.S.S. GILMER (APD-11) on 28 December 1944. The GILMER was a converted four stacker and the staff office space and living quarters, compressed into the upper and lower forward troop quarters, were considerably cramped. ComUDTs required his own flagship since he had been given tactical control at the objective, and since the staff proposed to operate almost continuously in the forward areas under both the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets, whichever was conducting an operation.
Not all the staff immediately embarked on the GILMER, however, ComUDTs and two members of his Staff left PEARL HARBOR on 25 December 1944 to observe the LINGAYEN operation and to coordinate the activities of the UDTs committed. The flagship remained at PEARL. ComUDTs flew to the forward area and witnessed the operation from the flagship of the Comdr. of the Support Force. During this operation, on ComUDTs directive, Army liaison personnel from high echelons of the assault units were, for the first time, assigned to operating UDTs as observers, and rough UDT charts showing the results of their reconnaissance were prepared. The charts were reproduced on gelatin “Ditto” pads and a limited distribution of them was made on D-Day to certain command ships of the assault forces.
Up until this time, UDT training and mission had been purely for demolition of obstacles, but it was perceived that UDTs could in the future perform very valuable work of a reconnaissance nature, even though no demolition of obstacles was necessary. The teams participating at LINGAYEN had had no training in the hydrographic reconnaissance, as distinct from demolition function and the information contained on their charts, although valuable, was not complete. Further, the distribution of the information was very limited and did not take place until D-Day just at the hour of the assault.
During the course of this operation, the ship on which ComUDTS and the two members of his staff were embarked was hit by a suicide plane, but no UDT staff personnel were injured.
Meanwhile, the rest of the staff went aboard the GILMER at PEARL and immediately went to MAUI to conduct rehearsals with the teams selected for the IWO JIMA operation. A training order was written and detailed rehearsals in reconnaissance and in actual demolition were conducted over a period of three days. The reconnaissance and demolition functions were conceived of as wholly separate with the reconnaissance coming first. Base charts of all the practice beaches and their approaches were made up by the staff, drawn to a uniform scale, and distributed to each team for the plotting of the information gained by the reconnaissance. After each UDT rehearsal, personnel from the teams came aboard the flagship where they were interviewed and the information gained was digested into dispatch form and was also placed on a master chart to be reproduced in quantity, on an Ozalid white print machine which was installed on the flagship. Speed in getting this information ready for distribution was emphasized, LCI(G)s simulated support fire during these rehearsals and a detailed schedule of maneuvers for the fire support ships was drawn up and put into effect. A lengthy list of reports to be made by voice radio by all participating units during the actual operation was drawn up, and a flag plot procedure was established to coordinate these reports and thus keep ComUDTs constantly informed of the activities of all units under his control. Demolition activities of various teams were coordinated and planned in detail to avoid the danger inherent in un-concerted action.
These rehearsals were invaluable in training the staff and gave rise to many of the techniques that were to become standard. At the end of the three - day period, the flagship returned to PEARL where it continued work on the UDT operation plan for IWO JIMA. Early in January, the flagship departed for ULITHI where the four teams selected for the IWO JIMA operation had already gathered on their APDs. ComUDTs was recalled from LINGAYEN to PEARL HARBOR to make and eyewitness report to Cincpac on Jap suicide plane technique, after which he flew to ULITHI to rejoin his staff.
At ULITHI, two further rehearsals were held, for which the Staff prepared Training Orders. These rehearsals were conducted with the supporting LCIs and DDs that were to be used at IWO and the emphasis was on working out complete plans for the most effective use of fire support.
At ULITHI, ComUDTs’ first operation plan for IWO was distributed. It contained a minutely worked out time schedule for all Units involved with all teams based on their relationship to "ROGER" hour, which was set as the time that the LCP(R)s carrying the swimmers crossed the DD line on their way to the beach. It contained detailed fire support areas, positions, and techniques, and provisions for distributing UDT information by means of dispatches, charts, and return of Army liaison personnel.
En-route to the objective, at SAIPAN, the staff conducted a final rehearsal on compiling and distributing UDT information.
At IWO JIMA, four teams made a successful reconnaissance of the Eastern Beaches on the morning of D-2 and of the Western Beaches in the afternoon. No demolition was necessary. During the operation, all support and operating units were controlled by ComUDTs from the flagship. The LCI(G)s, on taking station at a pre-arranged time, apparently gave the Japs the impression, from the regularity of their approach, that they constituted an assault wave. They encountered heavy fire and all received hits. However, their withdrawal was accomplished and casualties were speedily transferred. These circumstances put a heavy load on the flagship voice circuits. As a result, team and swimmer reports were somewhat confused from lack of circuit discipline and some delay was encountered in withdrawing the teams because of the lack of complete knowledge as to whether all swimmers had been recovered by their boats. This communication confusion was complicated by the fact that the current at IWO swept several swimmers southward so that they were recovered by different boats than they had started from.
Several hours after each reconnaissance, a dispatch summarizing the UDT information was sent from the Flagship for relay to the Attack Forces approaching the target. On the night of D-2, two members of the staff, with 4 Marine liaison personnel and 4 men from the teams were put aboard the single reserve APD and sent back to rendezvous with the Attack Forces. They were transferred at sea to the Attack Force and TransRon flagships with copies of the dispatches and UDT charts. At dawn on the morning of D-Day, when the Attack Forces arrived in the area, further transfers of staff personnel with charts were made to command ships. In accordance with ComUDTs Op-Plan, each team furnished guides to the first landing waves, while staff personnel reported to the Force Beach Master.
On the night of D-1, the U.S.S BLESSMAN (APD-48) with UDT 15 embarked was hit by a Jap bomb. The GILMER, ComUDTs’ flagship, went alongside and staff personnel took an active part in putting out the fire on the BLESSMAN and taking off casualties. On D plus 2, members of the Staff conducted a reconnaissance of a sand shoal off Purple Beach. This mission was accomplished with the GILMER and two of her LCP(R)s. A quick withdrawal was necessary because of accurate mortar and machine gun fire but the mission was satisfactorily accomplished.
On D plus 2, D plus 3, and D plus 4, members of the staff supervised the work of teams personnel in aiding to clear the beaches which had become congested with broached landing craft. On D plus 4, ComUDTs turned over command of the team at IWO to the senior UD Team Commanding Officer, and reported to ComPhibsGroup ONE with his staff for planning purposes.
The flagship departed IWO for LEYTE and advanced planning for the OKINAWA operation was done en-route. On arrival at LEYTE, the UDT Operation Plan for OKINAWA was completed and distributed. It embodied all the proven techniques, the lessons learned from IWO, and several new ideas. The feasibility and importance of wide and early distribution of UDT information had been demonstrated at IWO. As a result it was planned to distribute information in four ways: by dispatch, by chart, by a report amplifying the information in the dispatches and charts, and by liaison personnel who would be returned to all Army assault units down to BLTS. The dispatches were to be on the completion of each reconnaissance or demolition operation; the charts, reports, and personnel were to be put aboard reserve APDs on D-2 to rendezvous with Attack Forces on D-1. On D-1 at sea, the charts and reports with UDT personnel would be distributed to all Navy TransRon, TransDiv, Attack Force, Control and Tractor flagships and Army personnel would be returned to their respective battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps. The fire support ships, under this Plan were to make their approach in a staggered, irregular formation so as not to present the appearance of a landing wave. Further refinements in the system of radio reports were made so as to ensure that swimmers would be accounted for at all times. More definite arrangements for supporting air strikes and smoke cover were made. A minesweeping annex was added to the plan to aid in integrating UDT operations with sweeping operation.
While at LEYTE, a training order was written and rehearsals were had with 6 teams who were to operate on the main landing beaches at OKINAWA. On 12 March 1945, the staff left LEYTE in the flagship and proceeded to ULITHI where the 4 teams to be used at KERAMA RETTO and on the Demonstration beaches were staging. Further rehearsals were had with these teams and with the fire support ships.
On D-8 these latter 4 teams and the flagship arrived in the objective area. On D-7, a member of the staff accompanied each team in its reconnaissance of the beaches in KERAMA RETTO to aid in the preparation of the dispatches, charts and reports. The dispatches were sent in the afternoon of D-7 and the information contained therein was received in sufficient time by the Attack Forces to enable them to make necessary changes in their landing plan in accordance with UDT recommendations. Just at daylight on D-6, the day of the landing in KERAMA RETTO, the flagship of ComUDTs was struck a glancing blow by a Jap suicide plane, but damage to the ship was light and there were no casualties among staff personnel. Distribution of charts, reports and personnel from the flagship to various echelons of the Attack Force continued until H-hour.
On D-5, the flagship with the other 6 UD Teams which had arrived in the area from LEYTE, proceeded to the main beaches of OKINAWA where they made a visual reconnaissance of the beaches from the APDs. On D-3, a very successful reconnaissance was made with the loss of but one man. More than 3500 obstacles in the form of wooden posts set in the reef edge were discovered during the reconnaissance, most of which were considered to constitute a barrier to LVTs. In four shots, each carefully coordinated by ComUDTs, these obstacles were blown out of the beach approaches without incident. The information gained by the swimmers was collected, reproduced and made ready for distribution on the flagship according to plan, and all Army-Marine liaison personnel (total 30) were returned to their parent unit on D-1 morning. Congratulations on the excellence of the job performed were received by ComUDTs in dispatches from the Secretary of the Navy, and ComPhibsPac.
On D plus 6, ComUDTs departed the area by plane to make a rapid tour of forward bases to investigate possible sites for UDT rehabilitation centers, and then to go on to the UDT Training bases for a comprehensive survey of the future training program. The Chief Staff Officer and two staff members transferred to another APD to begin planning for the IE SHIMA and Eastern Islands operations, which were to follow almost immediately. Administration and the bulk of the staff remained on the GILMER which departed for PEARL HARBOR to start planning future operations. The staff members remaining in the OKINAWA area wrote and distributed a ComUDTs Op-Plan for IE SHIMA and briefed personnel of the two teams selected for that operation. Frequent conferences with the Fire Support
Commander resulted in excellent fire cover and the reconnaissance operations, lasting two days were completed without casualty. No demolition in the pre-assault phase was necessary although considerable blasting was done shortly after the landing to clear an approach channel for LSTs. Immediately after the landing on IE SHIMA the staff representatives departed for PEARL HARBOR to rejoin the rest of the staff and ComUDTs who returned to PEARL from the West Coast on May 3, 1945. On 7 May, most of the staff moved over to the MAUI to observe training, handle administrative work, and prepare for a conference on UDT work with representatives of BuOrd, Ft. Pierce, NCDT&E Base and AdComPhibsPac.
On 6 June 1945, ComUDTsPhibsPac was awarded the Navy Cross for the IWO JIMA operation and the Legion of Merit for the combined operations of IWO and OKINAWA by ComPhibsPac aboard the latter’s flagship at GUAM. In accordance with BuPers orders, Capt. Hanlon was then detached and his Chief Staff Officer Comdr. D.L. KAUFFMAN, USNR became acting ComUDTs.
June 17, 1945, Captain R.H. RODGERS, USN, reported and assumed command as ComUDTs at PEARL HARBOR. Arrangements were made to send 30 teams on 30 APDs to ATB Oceanside, California for a month's cold water training to begin 15 August 1945. At this time, a new command organization for UDTs was authorized by ComPhibsPac. The Underwater Demolition Group was made a Flotilla and two subordinate squadron commands were provided for. Captain RODGERS assumed the dual responsibility of Commander, Underwater
Demolition Flotilla and Commander Underwater Demolition Teams. Under him were Underwater Demolition Squadron ONE and TWO, each with a flagship and a separate Staff. The U.S.S. HOLLIS (APD-86) was selected as flagship for the UD Flotilla and the U.S.S. BLESSMAN (APD--48) and the U.S.S LANING (APD-55) were designated squadron flagships.
On 30 June 1945, ComUDTs departed PEARL for MANILA to report to ComPhibsPac. The rest of the Staff followed, and was embarked on the USS R. W. HERNDON (APD-121), temporary flagship, in MANILA. ComUDTs Operation Plan 7-45 for the KYUSHU operation, was written and reproduction began. It was ComUDTs intention to return with his Staff to Oceanside on 15 August to supervise the cold water training and the Operation Plan was to be distributed from there. With the Japanese peace offer on 10 August, twenty of the UDTs in training on the West Coast were alerted, and with the Jap surrender on the l4th, they were ordered to proceed at once to the forward area. ComUDTs, still in Manila, immediately wrote and distributed an Operation Plan (No. 8-45) that would serve as a general guide in the occupational tasks ahead. ComUDTs ordered his flagship forward from PEARL HARBOR and hoisted his broad command pennant at GUAM on 25 August 1945.
The flagship proceeded at once to TOKYO BAY – the first ship routed directly from GUAM to TOKYO. Under the Operation Plan, for the occupation, the U.S. Flotilla had been divided into 3 groups of 6 teams each, one to serve under the direction of each of the THIRD, FIFTH and SEVENTH PhibFor Commanders. The Flotilla was under the overall command of ComUDTs for the direction of the Groups in performing any services within the limits of their training and equipment. The teams in each group performed reconnaissance of several landing points and encountered no enemy opposition. Further valuable assistance was given to the landing forces in harbor clearances and ship demilitarization work by the UDTs.
While at TOKYO, authority was delegated to ComUDTs by ComPhibsPac to effect the withdrawal of the UD Flotilla from the operation area back to the West Coast, and to plan the re–organization of the UDTs on a peace–time basis. Conferences at TOKYO relative to the withdrawal of the THIRD UD Group were satisfactorily completed, and the flagship departed TOKY0 to confer with SEVENTH PhibFor representatives at OKINAWA. While conferences were taking place at OKINAWA, an approaching typhoon necessitated the formation of all ships present into Retirement Groups that proceeded west to ride out the storm. ComUDTs in his flagship was designated ComEscorts for the Retirement Groups. Returning to OKINAWA further conferences were held, and on 24 Sept. ComUDTs proceeded to WAKAYAMA, HONSHU for conferences with the Com5thPhibFor. The discussions as to the dates for team withdrawals were quickly concluded, and on 28 September, the flagship with the staff embarked, started for the West Coast via OKINAWA, GUAM, and PEARL HARBOR, there to set up the peacetime UDT program with headquarters at ATB, Coronado.
UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM TWENTY-SEVEN
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
4 October 1945
From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
Public Information Office.
Subject: Team History – Submission of.
Reference: (a) AlPac 219
Enclosure: (A) Chronological History of UDT #27.
1. In accordance with References (a), Enclosure (A) Is submitted for your information.
I. Formation – 15 February 1945, N.C.D.U., A.T.B., Fort Pierce, Florida. (a) Original basis of team – 17 officers, and 100 enlisted personnel. (b) Divided into four operating platoons of (3) three officers and (15) fifteen men in each; plus a headquarters platoon of (3) officers and twenty-seven (27) men.
(c) Commanding Officer – Lieutenant David G. Saunders.
Executive Officer (Temporary), CWO W. F. Raymor.
II. Basic Training – 15 February – 15 April 1945.
(a) A conditioning course of training which included “Hell” Week, two weeks of explosives, two weeks of recon- naissance, week of gunnery, week of “Standard” and a week of “Pay-Off”.
(b) During training, all volunteers that failed to measure up to swimming, and physical requirements were dropped.
III. Transition to Advanced Training Base – 29 April – 2 June 1945.
(a) Orders received for eighty–seven (87) men, thirteen (13) officers to report to San Bruno, California by 2400, 14 May 1945.
(b) Awaited transportation until 23 May 1945, then were transferred to Treasure Island, embarkation depot.
(c) Embarked USS SARATOGA – 25 May 1945, then transferred FFT to Pearl Harbor.
(d) Arrived Pearl Harbor 31 May 1945, and immediately transferred to Maui, T.H., aboard LSM.
(e) Reached Maui, T. H., NCDT, & E. Base on 1 June 1945.
IV. Commission and Advanced Training – 2 June – 31 July 1945.
(a) Commissioned on 2 June 1945; Lieutenant D.G. SAUNDERS, Commanding Officer. Began advance swimming program, reconnaissance technique, specialized demolition training including coral and lava blasting. Also invasion problems aboard APDs.
(b) Completed training at Maui, T.H., 31 July 1945 with a complement of eighty-one (81) men and thirteen (13) officers.
(c) Received orders on 2 August 1945 to return to A.T.B. Oceanside, California for cold-water swimming training.
(d) Left Maui, T.H., aboard USS INGRAM (APD-43) arriving at San Diego, California 9 August 1945. Took on supplies and gear, reported then to A.T.B., Oceanside, California on August 12 1945.
(e) Change of orders upon disembarking, replaced team aboard USS WALTER B.COBB (APD-106) on 13 August 1945; and with five other teams aboard APDs ordered to Segami, Wan, Japan.
V. Further Action Up To Date; 13 August 1945 – 6 October 1945. (a) Aboard USS WALTER B. COBB (APD-106) via Pearl Harbor and Eniwetok, arrived in Tokyo Bay, Japan on 3 September 1945.
(b) Stood by awaiting operational orders as needed; until 19 September1945, then received orders to return to San Diego, California, via Guam for reorganization .
(c) Arrived in Guam on 24 September 1945, loaded inert gear to be returned to San Diego, and passengers to Pearl harbor.
(d) Left Guam 27 September 1945, stopping to refuel at Eniwetok on 29 September 1945.
(e) Arrived in Pearl Harbor 6 October 1945 to refuel and drop passengers taken on at Guam.
Pop Karns’ bowling alley in Coronado was the West Coast hangout for Frogmen in the late 40’s and early 50’s. The bowling alley only had 4 lanes, lockers for civvies and a long bar. I don’t remember ever seeing anyone bowl – just drink.
The facility sat beside the Amphib Base across from the Silver Strand in Coronado and jetted out into San Diego Bay. Pop’s was strictly a Frog hangout, strangers entered at their own risk. All the local girls who hung out there had UDT stenciled on their butts.
Pop carried a tab for most guys, he would lend you money in a pinch and stowed your private vehicle when ops were extended. Many UDT vehicles were buried at sea off the rocks behind Pop’s into San Diego Bay. Such happenings usually took place on the last night in Diego when you shipped out to Korea.
I have often wondered how long Pop served in this capacity. I know he was there when I left in ’52. However, he was gone when I returned in ’03. Of course, if he had still been there he would have been over a hundred years old, but it still messed up my head.
His son, Jack, who was in training class 6 was a popular guy. He was in Team 1. After discharge he was on the local police force. He died too young: date of death was August 3, 2006.
If anyone out there has any more info, details or stories on Pop Karns please share.
Wow, Don---Great job with the 50's magazine. I am truly impressed.
Great Stuff Don -- Good work. Keep it up. Thanks, Don Belcher.
HEY DON------GOOD JOB -- ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY DIDN'T KICK US OUT OF THE HOTEL IN RIVERTON.. GERRY MEYER
Don, I was so happy to get this and happy to hear from you. Again, I was unable to attend the reunion. I had a granddaughter graduating from pharmacy school. I miss all of you. Tell everyone hello for me.
My address is:
2325 Ragland Road
Mansfield Texas 76063
Tom Swedensky wrote that he has received several letters from old team mates, indicating that the article " The Raid At Long Dong PO " has caused some severe flash backs. The most poignant letter came from team-mate Harry Barelka. Harry said he could not sleep for several nights. Then it finally came to him, sure enough after checking his little black book (he still has it) he found that “while we were in that little Chinese Bar two of the Chinese soldiers borrowed $10.00 each”.
If you remember Harry was the team loan officer (loan shark); he would loan money at 100% interest, compounded every pay day and we were paid twice a month.
Now these loans are still out-standing, which Harry says causes him serious mental anguish. At the present time Harry is working through his Attorney, Furman Sims, Esq., and his second cousin Hilary Barelka Rodham Clinton, secretary of state, to have these loans paid by the Chinese government.
So far their best offer is either Hong Cong Island, or the Great Wall Of China. Mr. Sims who is working on 20% commission plus expenses, recommends holding out for more. Harry is still trying to figure out the expense account for trips to Greece, Italy, Israel and Egypt. He is leaning toward accepting the offer of the Great Wall of China and he will then offer franchise opportunities for hot dog concessions. Any one interested in a franchise may contact his attorney Mr. Furman Sims, Esq. who practices law in California.
Harry also stated that if the Chinese government does not come to terms soon, he will have to fall back on his old collection agency -- ie. Moody, Murray and James Short.
Vivian Turner, the daughter of Kevin Roger Murphy, is seeking contact with men who knew her father. She is speaking for her brother as well. They lost contact with their father some years back and would like to correspond with anyone who knew him. Kevin Murphy came through Class 8 on the West Coast, was assigned to UDT 3 and UDT 12 and also served as an instructor at the Training Unit. He died October 6, 2007 in Estes Park, Larimer County, Colorado. Vivian's email address is email@example.com
Stories of Naval Frogmen in Korea.
Without the help of many people this work may never have gotten off the ground. My most sincere “Thanks” to the following:
1. Many old Frogs who were there and have better recall than I – who critiqued this work and pointed out facts that I over looked or had forgotten…their contributions made this work more correct and better. Far too many of them contributed to start naming names – but “Thanks” guys…
2. Ex-Frog, Don Belcher, contributed to the design of this book and did a great job – Thank you Don…
3. My wife, Laura, bless her – for the years I worked on this project she accused me of becoming a recluse. She has finally come to accept this obsession – (Well almost)…
4. Finally, to all you guys who served in the Teams in Korea and to whom this work is dedicated – I hope you are beginning to realize - you created a new chapter in Naval Special Warfare. By taking your ops inland, above the surf line – you created the idea for the SEALS and SEALS have become a major asset in fighting the kinds of war we are fighting today. BE PROUD…and “Thank You” for serving.
Review of Stories of Naval Frogmen in Korea.
Phil Carrico has presented here a series of stories that will inform and entertain. There are 18 separate accounts all with photographs. You will be more informed about the Inchon and Wonson Operations, the demolition of Hungnam as well as becoming more familiar with team-mates you will remember. Carrico’s love and respect for the Navy Frogmen is evident throughout.
determination to accurately record details of the events that occurred 60 years
ago is admirable. He is very sensitive,
however to “Old Frogs” and their memories.
He therefore welcomes your questions, comments and/or clarifications to
what he has written.
The book is in 8 ½ X 11 format with an attractive cover (See above). It sells for $15.00 plus $2.00 S & H.
Order from Phil at: PO Box 531 Daisetta, Tx 77533
Don C. Marler